Can the Actors Blocking Fuel in Mali Form a Government?

Short Answer: It is highly unlikely. While these groups have significant power to destabilize and pressure the state, they lack the capacity, legitimacy, and common purpose to directly form and run a functional government.

Who Are "These Actors"?

It's crucial to distinguish between the different groups involved in the fuel blockade and other destabilizing actions in Mali. They are not a unified bloc.

The Political-Military Bloc: The CSP-PSD

This is the coalition of predominantly northern armed groups (like the CMA) that signed the 2015 Algiers Peace Agreement. They have political and territorial control, especially in the north. Their goal is not to overthrow the state but to secure maximum autonomy and a share of power and resources within a decentralized Mali. The fuel blockade is a tactical pressure tool against the military junta for reneging on the peace deal.

The Jihadist Insurgents: JNIM and ISIS-GS

These groups, particularly JNIM, control vast swathes of rural Mali. Their goal is explicitly revolutionary: to topple the current state and replace it with an Islamic emirate. They do not seek to form a government within the existing international system; they seek to overturn it.

Why They Cannot Form a Traditional Government

1. Fundamental Divisions and Contradictory Goals

The CSP-PSD and JNIM are ideologically opposed and often militarily in conflict.

CSP-PSD: Seeks autonomy within a secular, recognized state. They are political negotiators.

JNIM: Seeks a theocratic state and views the CSP-PSD groups as apostates or rivals for territorial control.

These actors cannot form a coherent coalition government because their end goals are mutually exclusive. There is no common vision for the state.

2. Power to Disrupt vs. Power to Administer

Blockading fuel, launching attacks, and controlling rural tracks is a demonstration of negative power—the power to sabotage, coerce, and prevent the state from functioning.

Forming a government requires positive power: the ability to administer, provide services, manage an economy, pay a civil service, conduct foreign relations, and secure international recognition. None of these actors possess this comprehensive administrative capacity.

3. Lack of Broad Legitimacy and International Recognition

Any government formed by force by these actors would be considered illegitimate by a significant portion of the Malian population and would be immediately pariahs on the international stage. This would lead to crippling sanctions and a complete cutoff of international aid, upon which Mali's economy is deeply dependent.

4. The Incumbent Military Junta Holds the Capital and Army

Despite its weaknesses, the junta in Bamako still controls the central state apparatus, the capital, and what remains of the national army. It has the advantage of being the recognized authority, albeit one that seized power illegally. A direct military takeover of Bamako by these disparate actors is not a feasible scenario.

The More Likely Scenarios

Instead of forming a national government, the power of these actors leads to different outcomes:

Scenario 1: De Facto Partition and Warlordism

Mali continues to fragment. The CSP-PSD consolidates its rule in the north (Azawad), the junta controls a shrinking central state from Bamako, and jihadists dominate the vast rural hinterlands. This is the status quo, accelerated.

Scenario 2: A Negotiated Settlement Under Duress

The pressure from the blockade and insurgency could force the junta back to the negotiating table with the CSP-PSD, leading to a new power-sharing agreement that gives the northern groups more autonomy. This would be a government influenced by, not formed by, these actors.

Scenario 3: Continued Collapse and Jihadist Ascendancy

If the state collapses completely, the most organized and ruthless armed group—likely JNIM—would be best positioned to fill the ultimate vacuum in the long run, establishing its own form of governance as it already does in its controlled areas.

Conclusion

The actors blocking fuel in Mali possess significant coercive and disruptive power. They can strangle the economy, challenge the state's monopoly on violence, and make the country ungovernable from the center.

However, they cannot form a legitimate, functional, and internationally recognized national government due to their internal divisions, lack of administrative capacity, and contradictory goals. Their power is the power to break, not to build. The most probable future for Mali is not a new government formed by these actors, but a further fragmentation of sovereignty among them, the junta, and other emerging powers.