How Large is Jama'at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM)?

Providing a precise, verifiable number for JNIM's size is extremely difficult due to the nature of insurgencies. However, based on analyses from security firms, international organizations, and regional governments, the most common estimate places JNIM's fighting force at between 1,000 and 3,000 core fighters.

JNIM is al-Qaeda's official branch in the Sahel region of Africa. Formed in 2017 from a merger of several jihadist groups, it has become the most potent and widespread insurgent force in Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger.

Understanding the Numbers: Core vs. Total Influence

The figure of 1,000-3,000 fighters typically refers to the core, mobile, and regularly armed members. However, this number alone is misleading because it doesn't capture JNIM's full strength, which lies in its deep local integration and support networks.

Full Strength Includes a Broader Ecosystem

A more comprehensive view of JNIM's "size" must include a wider ecosystem that provides support, intelligence, and temporary manpower. This includes:

Part-time Militia and Local Sympathizers: Individuals who may farm or live in villages but take up arms for specific attacks or to enforce JNIM's rule in their home area. This pool could number in the low thousands.

Logistical and Informant Networks: A critical component of JNIM's success is its vast network of couriers, suppliers, and informants embedded within communities. These individuals are not counted as fighters but are essential to JNIM's operations.

Forced and Voluntary Collaborators: In areas they control, JNIM coerces or persuades locals to provide food, shelter, and information. The line between supporter and coerced civilian is often blurred.

Factors Contributing to JNIM's Growth and Resilience

JNIM's ability to maintain and grow its forces is not based on raw recruitment numbers alone, but on a powerful strategy.

Exploitation of Local Grievances: JNIM expertly exploits long-standing tensions between ethnic groups and grievances against corrupt or absent central governments. They often position themselves as protectors of marginalized communities.

Provision of Governance and Services: In areas where the state has withdrawn, JNIM imposes its own form of rough justice, settles disputes, and sometimes provides basic services, winning a degree of local acquiescence or support.

Military and Political Opportunism: The group has grown significantly by capitalizing on the instability following military coups in Mali and Burkina Faso, and the subsequent withdrawal of French and UN forces. They fill the security vacuum left behind.

Co-opting Existing Militias: JNIM has successfully formed tactical, often localized, alliances with community-based self-defense militias, effectively absorbing them or coordinating attacks with them.

Comparison with the Islamic State in the Sahel (ISIS-GS)

JNIM's main rival in the region is the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISIS-GS). While both groups are formidable, they differ in structure and strategy.

JNIM is generally assessed to be larger and more deeply embedded within local communities than ISIS-GS. Its al-Qaeda-affiliated strategy prioritizes long-term integration over sheer brutality. In contrast, ISIS-GS is often described as smaller, more mobile, and more brutally sectarian, which has limited its ability to build the same level of broad local support, though it remains a deadly force.

Conclusion

While JNIM's core fighting force is estimated to be in the low thousands, this number fails to capture the group's true strength. Its power derives from a deeply embedded ecosystem of part-time fighters, logistical networks, and local collaborators that may involve thousands more individuals.

Therefore, JNIM is best understood not as a standing army of a specific size, but as a resilient and adaptive insurgency whose "size" fluctuates and is deeply intertwined with the local population. Its continued growth is a direct result of its ability to exploit state weakness, local conflicts, and governance failures across the Sahel.