Wittgenstein vs. Searle: Philosophy of Mind

Exploring the fundamental conflict between internal biological intentionality and external linguistic practice

John Searle

Biological Naturalism and Intrinsic Intentionality

Core Principles

Intentionality is a real, intrinsic, biological feature of brains

Mental states are caused by neurobiological processes

Intentionality is a physical feature, like digestion

Brain states have meaning intrinsically, not derived from external assignment

Famous for the "Chinese Room Argument" against strong AI

Central Claim

"The mind is in the head." Intentional states are real, internal, biological phenomena.

Ludwig Wittgenstein

Meaning as Use and the Rejection of Inner States

Core Principles

"The meaning of a word is its use in the language"

Meaning is not an internal picture or representation

Rejects the possibility of a "private language"

Intentionality is part of public, rule-following behavior

Seeks to dissolve the mind-body problem as a linguistic confusion

Central Claim

"The mind is not in the head;" it is manifested in public behavior within social contexts.

The Core Conflict

🧠Searle's Position

Intentionality is an internal, causal, biological property of the brain. Mental states are real entities with causal powers.

⚡The Fundamental Issue

If Wittgenstein is correct, then Searle is making a "category mistake" - looking for a thing (brain state) that is the meaning, when meaning is actually a pattern of activity.

💬Wittgenstein's Position

Intentionality (meaning) is an external, public, behavioral practice. It's not inside us but part of our active engagement with the world.

Conclusion: The Philosophical Stakes

Searle recognizes that Wittgenstein's project, if successful, doesn't just offer a different theory of mind—it dissolves the very problem his own theory is trying to solve.

"If Wittgenstein's later philosophy is right, then my entire project is mistaken. But I believe it's not right, and here's why." - John Searle

Searle's work can be seen as an attempt to save the reality of the inner mental world from what he views as the overly behaviorist and anti-scientific tendencies of the Wittgensteinian tradition. He attempts to incorporate Wittgensteinian insights through his concept of the "Background" while maintaining that intentionality is fundamentally a biological phenomenon.

This debate continues to influence contemporary philosophy of mind, cognitive science, and artificial intelligence research, raising fundamental questions about where meaning resides and how we should study the mind.

Philosophy of Mind Comparison | Wittgenstein vs. Searle