Patron States in the Sudan Civil War
The conflict in Sudan is primarily between the Sudanese Armed Forces under General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan and the Rapid Support Forces under General Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo (Hemedti). International involvement has turned it into a complex proxy war.
Egypt is the primary regional ally of the SAF. Its interests are deeply rooted in national security. It views a stable, friendly government in Khartoum as essential for managing the Nile River, combating Islamist militancy, and securing its southern border. Cairo sees the SAF as the legitimate state institution and fears the rise of a powerful, unpredictable militia like the RSF on its doorstep.
While both Gulf powers have historically supported the RSF, they also maintain relations with the SAF. Their primary interest is stability in the Red Sea region, which is vital for global trade. They see the SAF as a key pillar of any future state structure and have engaged with Burhan in diplomatic forums. Their support is more diplomatic and financial, aiming to protect their significant investments in Sudan.
Evidence suggests Iran has re-established ties with the SAF, providing armed drones and other military support. For Tehran, this is an opportunity to regain a foothold in a strategic Red Sea state, project influence in the region, and counter its regional rivals, particularly Saudi Arabia and the UAE.
The UAE has emerged as the RSF's most important military and financial patron. It provides the RSF with sophisticated weapons, often shipped through Chad and Libya, and likely offers substantial financial backing. The UAE sees Hemedti as a capable, anti-Islamist strongman who can secure its interests, including access to Sudan's gold reserves and agricultural land, and counter the influence of Islamist factions within the SAF.
The Russian state-linked private military company, Wagner, has a long-standing relationship with the RSF. In exchange for military training and supplies, Wagner has gained lucrative concessions, particularly access to Sudan's vast gold mines. This relationship allows Moscow to project power in Africa, circumvent Western sanctions, and fund its operations elsewhere, including in Ukraine.
Chad's government, which faces its own internal instability, maintains close ethnic and political ties with Hemedti (who is from the same Zaghawa ethnic group that holds power in N'Djamena). It provides the RSF with a critical rear base, a conduit for weapons, and a market for smuggled goods. Other neighboring countries like the Central African Republic and Libya also serve as transit routes for Wagner and UAE-supplied arms.
Both the U.S. and Saudi Arabia have positioned themselves as primary mediators, hosting ceasefire talks in Jeddah. Their stated interest is to halt the violence, facilitate humanitarian aid, and steer Sudan toward a civilian-led government. However, their influence is limited by the deep involvement of other patrons and the unwavering determination of the warring generals.
These bodies are formally committed to a peaceful resolution and restoring Sudan's democratic transition. However, they have been largely sidelined by the military logic of the conflict and the power of the external state patrons directly backing the SAF and RSF.
No comments:
Post a Comment